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ABSTRACT  
The Baltic States are once again worried that their security is under threat. The United 
States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have responded with air 
patrols, joint exercises, and battalion-sized ground force deployments. As important as 
these efforts have been, they do not fully address Russia’s anti-access/area-denial 
(A2AD) and precision strike capabilities, both of which undermine NATO’s stratagem 
for deterring aggression in the first place. This article assesses the current military 
imbalance and describes two conflict scenarios in order to show how A2AD and 
precision weapons threaten extended deterrence. It concludes with a discussion of the 
policy implications. 
 
 
The Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – are once again worried that their 
security is under grave threat. They fear that Russia could undertake subversive and 
hostile action against them under the pretext of safeguarding the interests of local 
Russian-speaking populations.1 They also worry that Russia could use the same ‘hybrid’ 
approach (orchestrated by Moscow and supported by the Russian military, but executed 
by pro-Russian partisans, militias and intelligence operatives) as it did in Crimea in early 
2014 to achieve its aims.2 To address such concerns, the US and fellow members of 
NATO have taken steps to bolster defence of the Baltic States and to improve deterrence. 
 2 
These steps include increased air patrols, joint military exercises, prepositioning heavy 
military equipment, and the indefinite placement of four battalions and other small 
rotational forces in the region.3 
Important as these efforts have been, they do not address the most significant 
strategic problem confronting the Baltic members of NATO, which is the anti-access/area 
denial (A2AD) and precision strike challenge that Russia could impose on NATO, thanks 
to its existing force posture in the region. A2AD and precision weapons undermine 
efforts to extend deterrence in the Baltic States, over which Russia enjoys a military 
advantage. Russian forces are already capable of seizing Baltic territory quickly in a 
conventional or hybrid offensive. Long-range precision weapons enable Russian forces to 
disrupt, neutralise and destroy (or simply threaten) NATO’s small forward-deployed 
presence and its prepositioned military equipment.4 Meanwhile, Russia could use its 
A2AD capabilities to make it prohibitively difficult for NATO to enter the theatre of 
operations forcibly both to support and reinforce front line troops.   
Of course, the fact that Russia has a robust precision strike and A2AD capability 
does not automatically imply that it will use them in a war. Nor is war inevitable. 
Deterrence depends on credibility and credibility turns on how each side perceives the 
other’s willingness and ability to prevail on the battlefield. To deter Russian aggression in 
the Baltics, NATO must convince Russia that any attempt to conquer Baltic territory will 
be costly and perilous. Perceptions to the contrary are detrimental to NATO’s credibility, 
risking heightened regional insecurity, more divisive nationalism in East Central Europe, 
and nuclear proliferation incentives for neighbouring front line states.5 
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The precision strike and A2AD challenge in Eastern Europe has already been 
identified, but existing work largely focuses on the air and naval threat. 6 Although 
Russia’s counter-air and counter-naval capabilities are important, insufficient attention 
has been paid to how precision and A2AD weapons might impact operations on the 
ground.7 The threat of invasion is only credible when the invader has the ability to take 
and hold territory, and Russia will have to use ground forces to pursue such an objective 
in the Baltics. Ground troops will also be needed to defend Baltic territory, but they in 
turn will need to be resupplied and reinforced in any prolonged ground campaign. More 
importantly, because forward-deployed ground troops are a tangible signal of NATO’s 
commitment to the Baltics, such forces can reduce the risk of conflict in the first place. 
This article therefore argues that any meaningful plan to counter the Russian precision 
strike and A2AD threat must involve a fundamental shift in NATO’s forward-deployed 
force posture. Specifically, there needs to be less reliance on small rotational forces and 
prepositioned equipment, a much larger deployment of NATO ground troops in the 
Baltics than the four multinational battalion-sized battlegroups approved at the 2016 
NATO Warsaw Summit for the Baltic States and Poland, and a reorientation of Baltic 
ground forces to consider insurgency a core mission.8 The goal of this article is not to 
encourage NATO or the United States to adopt these measures, several of which are 
provocative. Instead, the objective is to identify clearly what steps are necessary if they 
want to deter Russian aggression against the Baltic States meaningfully. 
This article first outlines the reasons for why A2AD and precision weapons 
threaten the military foundations of extended deterrence. A description follows of the 
military balance of power in the Baltic region and an outline of war scenarios showing 
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how NATO’s efforts to defend its northeastern flank would face major difficulties. This 
article concludes with an analysis of policy implications for tackling the A2AD and 
precision strike challenge in the Baltic region. Consistent with A2AD literature, the 
analysis here assumes that any militarised conflict would be non nuclear, despite Russia’s 
use of nuclear threats in recent crises.9  
How A2AD and Precision Warfare Complicate Extended Deterrence  
Extended deterrence describes the action of a country pledging to defend an ally from 
attack by an adversary. In making this pledge, the defending country seeks to raise the 
costs of attack high enough that they become unacceptable to the adversary. Deterrence 
can take two forms: deterrence by punishment and deterrence by denial. Deterrence by 
punishment means that the defender threatens to inflict an intolerable amount of harm on 
the adversary if it decides to attack. US nuclear strategy had this essence in the first 
twenty years of the Cold War. Under the doctrine of ‘Massive Retaliation’, the US 
threatened to unleash its nuclear forces on Soviet military and political assets in response 
to Soviet aggression against West Germany and other NATO allies. It was an all-or-
nothing strategy designed to turn the Soviet Union into a smoking, radiating ruin at the 
end of two hours. By doctrinally shifting to ‘flexible response’ in the late 1960s, NATO 
began to emphasise deterrence by denial, by which it planned to prevent Soviet forces 
from succeeding on the battlefield in the first place rather than waiting until after the fact 
to retaliate with strategic nuclear weapons.10  
 Both forms of deterrence require a strong and effective military foundation that 
the ally and adversary believe the defender can and will use. In other words, the deterrent 
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must be credible. In the presence of nuclear weapons, meeting this requirement has been 
problematic because a defender such as the US might be tempted to sacrifice its ally in 
order to avoid suffering from harm itself. To demonstrate its commitment accordingly, 
the US positioned its own soldiers in the territory of its allies. Doing so tied the fate of 
US troops to the security of those beneficiary allies, thereby creating a ‘tripwire’ effect 
(the phrase refers to a small military force whose involvement in hostilities will trigger 
the use of a larger force).11 At least during the latter parts of the Cold War, those troops 
were armed with sophisticated weaponry so as to raise the likelihood that they could hold 
off the adversary long enough for reinforcements to arrive. Moreover, throughout the 
Cold War, the US maintained a more credible forcible entry capability than it possesses 
today.12 As such, troop deployments were more than just tripwires. They were also a 
fighting force capable perhaps of persevering against the adversary. Such has been the 
utility of land power for deterrence.13 
Yet recent technological developments threaten to deprive US land power of the 
ability to present itself as a credible fighting force and thus to bolster extended deterrence. 
Specifically, A2AD and precision weapons challenge how the US deploys and employs 
its ground forces. To begin with, A2AD and precision weapons might undermine the 
longstanding stratagem of the US for defending its vast alliance network. Geographically 
distant but globally committed, the US necessarily spreads its military assets around the 
world.14 Thus, when hostilities break out, forward-based forces must hold out long 
enough for reinforcements to arrive. 
Adversaries can use long-range precision and A2AD weapons to counter this 
stratagem by making it difficult for the US to defend and reinforce its deployments.15 At 
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the start of a conflict, an adversary can hit forward-deployed units with long-range 
precision weapons. Command-and-control assets, troop staging areas, supply dumps, 
maintenance depots and ports are the targets in the greatest danger during this early stage. 
Although forward-based units will likely withstand these initial strikes, they will need to 
be quickly reinforced and resupplied, and an adversary can then use A2AD weapons to 
impede this. Long-range anti-access weapons can damage ports and airfields, precluding 
easy access into the theatre of operations, while shorter-range anti-access weapons 
(including sea mines, diesel submarines, patrol boats and anti-ship missiles) can also 
complicate forcible entry by making it risky for naval ships to operate close to shore, 
limiting their ability to launch airstrikes, seize beachheads or offload equipment. Even if 
US forces successfully penetrate anti-access defences, they must still contend with area-
denial weapons, which can harass staging areas, supply dumps and resupply convoys.16 
Worse still, precision technologies are becoming less expensive as they continue 
to mature and the effect this has on extended deterrence is subtle but important. Facing 
rising personnel costs, shrinking defence budgets and new technological innovations, US 
defence planners are eager to substitute manpower with technology.17 Ironically, although 
precision weapons make the US military more capable, they make the country appear less 
reliable as a security guarantor, especially when they replace forward-based ground 
troops. Allies and adversaries know it is far easier for US leaders to write off jets, ships, 
drones and robots than it is for them to resist calls for revenge over the loss of American 
lives. Shared risk, not materiel, binds allies in a crisis. 
[H1]A2AD and Precision Strike in the Baltic Region 
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In light of these issues, it is important to examine both the balance of forces in the Baltic 
region and the likely ways Russia might use its precision strike and A2AD capabilities.  
Individually and collectively, the contrast between Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
and Russia in terms of military power is stark. Estonia has a conscript-based army of 
5,300 personnel and one patrol vessel.18 The Latvian navy has several more patrol and 
mine-countermeasures vessels, but total active personnel numbers about 5,300.19 Both of 
these countries, as well as Lithuania, have only a handful of utility aircraft and depend on 
the NATO air-policing mission for defence of their airspace. Lithuania, the biggest of the 
three Baltic States, has the largest military, with an active duty army of approximately 
12,000, and a navy of four mine warfare vessels and four patrol vessels.20 Nuclear forces 
aside, the Russian military has about 845,000 active duty personnel, of which 250,000 are 
in the army. The Western Military District is one of four operational strategic commands 
of the Russia’s army. Headquartered in St Petersburg, it comprises one tank division, one 
tank brigade, one mechanised division and five mechanised brigades, in addition to 
several other brigades that serve combat support roles.21 The capabilities of these forces 
have increased as a result of modernisation efforts that began after the 2008 Russo–
Georgian War. Since then, Russian ground forces have improved both their 
professionalism and readiness. They are organised in mobile brigade formations suitable 
for low- and medium-intensity conflict.22 The Russian navy has four major naval fleets, 
one of which is the Baltic Fleet, based in Kaliningrad, with several submarines and more 
than 50 surface ships, including destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships and 
minesweepers.23 The Russian air force is similarly capable: it has 36 fighter squadrons 
and about 30 ground attack squadrons, to say nothing of its attack helicopter and nuclear-
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capable bomber fleets.24 Despite assertions that the Russian military is bedevilled by 
structural weaknesses and financial constraints, it has been able to simultaneously mount 
military operations in Ukraine, an intervention in Syria, and a major military manoeuver 
known as Center-2015, in which tens of thousands of troops and law enforcement 
personnel rehearsed rapid mobilization and deployment.  
 Given this massive imbalance, the Baltic States rely on the promise of NATO 
intervention for their security.25 While NATO enjoys military superiority over Russia, its 
presence in the Baltics is limited. Consider the NATO air-policing mission. Before 2014, 
it constituted the ‘only NATO military presence in the Baltic States’.26 Nevertheless, 
although NATO conducts constant surveillance of its airspace in the region, the 
deployments provided by the air forces of fellow NATO allies are small, now usually 
numbering about four aircraft. As such, their military effectiveness is hard to overstate: in 
any war scenario, Baltic airbases are vulnerable to Russian artillery and precision-guided 
weapons, and thereafter Russia’s air force would find it relatively easy to gain air 
superiority in the region.  
 NATO’s land power presence in the Baltic States is even weaker. Because the 
1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act stipulated against ‘additional permanent stationing of 
substantial combat forces’, the Baltic States and other former Soviet-bloc alliance 
members have not hosted the same military commitments from the US as their Western 
European counterparts.27 The result has been an imbalance in the distribution of NATO 
forces across Europe. One analysis indicates that 80 per cent of NATO’s total European 
troop strength is in Western Europe, whereas only five of 28 NATO installations are 
located on East Central European territory. As of early 2014, the total number of US 
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troops in East Central Europe was just short of 150.28 This imbalance was moot when the 
political environment in Eastern Europe was peaceful, but NATO’s eastern members 
have developed acute anxieties about this imbalance amid recent Russian aggression and 
have asked for major troop deployments from the US and other allies. In July 2016, 
NATO members agreed to position four battalion-sized battlegroups in the Baltic States 
and Poland on a rotational basis. The US also plans to have three brigades based in 
Europe on a continual basis by 2017 and will also preposition heavy military hardware in 
the Baltic region.29   
Multiple options are available to Russia to exploit this military imbalance in an 
attack on the Baltic States, but its recent conflicts with Georgia and Ukraine indicate two 
scenarios: a pre-emptive conventional invasion ordered by Moscow and carried out by 
Russian military units; and a subconventional (or hybrid) incursion orchestrated by 
Moscow and supported by Russian military units, but executed by pro-Russian partisans, 
militias, intelligence operatives and volunteer forces. Both scenarios involve precision 
and A2AD weapons challenging NATO’s forward-based and follow-on ground forces, 
and none of the force posture proposals considered by NATO at the 2016 Warsaw 
Summit are likely to meet the challenge. In this event, the credibility of NATO’s 
deterrent will suffer accordingly. Each scenario is briefly discussed below. 
[H2]A Pre-emptive Conventional Invasion 
If Russia were to launch a conventional attack against the Baltic States, such an invasion 
would likely come without warning. After all, Russia has local (but not regional) military 
dominance over Baltic and NATO forces. If the decision to seize territory had already 
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been made, Russian leaders would not want to give NATO time to begin mobilising its 
forces. And Russian forces can mount just such a no-notice operation, having increased 
its readiness through ‘snap’ exercises, which allow regular and reserve units to rehearse 
mobilization and deployment plans.   Some analysts speculate that Russia could transport 
up to 60,000 troops within 72 hours by air alone.30 It is possible that Baltic and NATO 
ground troops could wake up one morning with Russian units already operating in their 
rear. In such a scenario, Russian forces would probably use precision weapons to hit 
NATO’s air and missile defences, prepositioned equipment and forward-deployed ground 
forces in a sudden pre-emptive strike. Such an attack might occur in conjunction with 
Russian special operations units manoeuvering behind NATO lines to harass command-
and-control assets. Meanwhile, Russia’s land-, sea- and air-delivered A2AD weapons 
could hinder reinforcements, making it difficult and costly for follow-on forces to link up 
with the prepositioned hardware and forward-deployed garrisons that survived the initial 
long-range strikes. Although a conventional invasion is perhaps less likely than a hybrid 
incursion, in part due to the risk of escalation, it is also the most dangerous scenario for 
NATO given the existing military imbalance and lack of geographic depth, which means 
Russian weapons can easily range targets across the entirety of their territory.  
[H2]A Hybrid Incursion 
Due to the risks inherent in a pre-emptive conventional invasion, Russia might prefer a 
subconventional approach if it were to attack. As this approach would exploit Russia’s 
local military power and ethno-political ties in the region, a hybrid operation would have 
at least three advantages. First, it might be harder to detect and diagnose in its earliest 
stages, generating a protracted debate within NATO instead of a decisive and immediate 
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response. Second, to the degree that a hybrid incursion relies upon pro-Russian groups 
already living within the Baltics, it might undermine the legitimacy of any military 
response by NATO troops. After all, pro-Russian agitators (in the Estonian city of Narva, 
for example, that is home to a large Russian-speaking population) could articulate 
legitimate grievances against their governments and may cite other nationalist and ethnic 
movements in Europe as justification. Furthermore, neutralising such groups might 
require NATO troops to undertake such provocative actions as arresting and even 
harming NATO citizens. Third, by depending on militias as well as other irregular (and 
ostensibly unmarked forces), a hybrid incursion would make it very difficult for NATO 
to use long-range, stand-off weapons of its own (including drones) without undue risk to 
civilians. Distinguishing friend from foe in a hybrid scenario could require heavy reliance 
on ground troops and counterinsurgency-style tactics. 
If recent Russian operations in Ukraine offer any guidance, then a 
subconventional assault would begin with Russian-directed espionage, propaganda and 
agitation.31 These early operations will attempt to organise anti-government forces and 
foment popular discontent with the government, thereby providing a pretext for Russian 
interference. Such efforts will be hard to detect and unlikely to justify a sizeable increase 
in NATO ground troops. Eventually, pro-Russian agitators within the country can call for 
support and protection from Moscow, either because they have themselves destabilised 
the domestic political situation or because they have provoked violent repression by the 
state security apparatus. Whichever is the case, Russia might intervene by providing 
material support, specialised training, and an influx of ‘volunteers’ who just so happen to 
be well-trained Russian troops. In this scenario, Russia would use its conventional 
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military power to deter and delay a meaningful military response by NATO, and threaten 
the use of precision strikes and A2AD weapons. 
[H1]Policy Implications 
Although it is unlikely that Russia will resort to armed force in the Baltic region, these 
scenarios are useful, not because they are probable, but because they suggest how Russia 
might choose to use violent means if deterrence were to fail. To the degree that NATO 
can anticipate how Russia might use military force in the Baltics, the alliance can 
calibrate its deterrence threats so as to make war less likely in the first place. The 
problem is that NATO is contemplating solutions that are unlikely to resolve the 
underlying problem. Russia’s precision strike and A2AD capabilities render existing 
forward-deployed ground troops vulnerable, making it easier for Russia to present NATO 
with a fait accompli. NATO’s current solutions largely involve prepositioned heavy 
military hardware, four battalion-sized battlegroups, and modest deployments of 
rotational forces.  
If this analysis is correct, it suggests a different approach to deterrence in the 
Baltics. The first policy implication is to recognise that technology is a necessary, but 
insufficient, part of the solution to precision strike and A2AD. The US Department of 
Defense’s ‘Third Offset Strategy’ is an important initiative given its emphasis on 
investing in new technologies, including drones, artificial intelligence and three-
dimensional printing, ,to counter a wide range of adversary capabilities, including A2AD. 
Nevertheless, even advanced technology  is limited in what it can achieve for the US in 
terms of deterring Russia and reassuring NATO’s Baltic allies. The precision strike and 
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A2AD challenge is severe because it threatens the US’s longstanding stratagem of using 
forward-deployed ground forces to signal credibility. However, if forward-deployed 
ground forces cannot fend off invading forces, their value to allies is at risk of primarily 
being symbolic. As noted, their mission should not be to perish in the hope that their loss 
will trigger a wider US intervention, but to meaningfully bolster NATO’s ability to 
obstruct Russian forces on the battlefield. The Third Offset – in its emphasis on robotics 
and unmanned autonomous strike aircraft – overlooks this valuable mission that ground 
forces can perform. 
 The second policy implication is that no easy or cheap solutions are available for 
answering the A2AD and precision strike threat. We believe that only two options in East 
Central Europe exist, both of which entail considerable cost and risk. The first is to 
repudiate the NATO–Russia Founding Act and base permanently large numbers of 
NATO troops on territories located in the alliance’s northeastern flank. The second is to 
deploy large numbers of rotational forces – far more than are currently being considered 
– in the region.32 Either step is bound to be provocative to Russia, although an explicit 
renunciation of the Founding Act would be particularly inflammatory. Such a move 
would require the political willingness that NATO might be incapable of mustering at 
present. Short of such measures, however, the A2AD and precision strike problem will 
remain acute and the credibility of NATO’s deterrent will suffer.  
These last two points culminate to the third: that insurgency should no longer be 
considered a collateral mission for Baltic ground forces. In the improbable event that 
Russia does attack the Baltics, the invasion would be swift and difficult for local NATO 
forces to defeat. Indeed, the Baltic States would likely lose their already small ground 
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forces in such an engagement. Even a robust forward-deployed presence will still be 
subject to punishing long-range strikes. It makes more sense to have Baltic ground forces 
trained and prepared for insurgency as their primary mission to make Russian targeting 
difficult and to improve deterrence by denial. Although transitioning Baltic ground forces 
to this insurgency-exclusive focus might come at a cost in terms of alliance 
interoperability, they are so small that their contribution to conventional operations will 
still be marginal at best. This is not say that Russia would find it impossible to deal with 
an insurgency. As an autocracy, it would face few political constraints in launching a 
‘nasty’ campaign. Nevertheless, the goal for the Baltic States is to increase the woes it 
can inflict on Russian military forces to the greatest extent possible. Guerrilla operations 
(rather than engaging in set-piece battles or being easily discoverable) will improve such 
efforts and also hamper any Russian operation, conventional or hybrid, thus buying time 
for NATO forces to respond.  
An irony exists here. When the Washington-based Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments released a report outlining what would eventually develop into 
the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM-GC), its 
authors asserted that US defence planners were unduly preoccupied with ‘the demands of 
modern irregular warfare’ and were ‘continuing to field forces more designed for waging 
the kinds of security threats that are fading into history’.33 This view was reasonable 
because of the growing conventional threat from China’s rise. Yet it is overstated if we 
take seriously the overwhelming military balance that favours Russia over its small three 
Baltic neighbours. To prepare for the absolute worst-case scenario, NATO would do well 
to place ‘the demands of modern irregular warfare’ onto Russia in order to deter and 
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defend against an attack on its northeastern flank. This need is all the more urgent should 
its stronger members be unwilling to provide meaningful conventional force deployments 
in that region.  
Finally, for NATO forces, these implications yield a conclusion that many 
policymakers and practitioners would find unpalatable: it makes little military sense to 
place prepositioned heavy military hardware and small rotational forces in the region. For 
one, these military assets simply provide instant targets that would be the first to suffer 
from long-range Russian strikes. For another, they do not address the fundamental 
problem of reassurance and deterrence. Small rotational forces will suffer heavily against 
a Russian onslaught without appreciably slowing it. Even if such forces serve as a 
‘tripwire,’ larger follow-on forces will experience extreme difficulties forcibly entering 
the theatre of operations, are likely to find their prepositioned equipment heavily 
damaged or inaccessible, and may well arrive to discover that the issue has already been 
settled. 
 
[H1]Conclusion 
The war scenarios that could take place in the Baltic States are unsavoury. Deterrence is 
clearly preferable. However, to make deterrence credible, NATO must deal with Russia’s 
precision strike and A2AD capabilities. The challenge is tractable, but the solutions are 
neither easy nor cost-free. Existing efforts, especially those focusing on small rotational 
forces, four battalion-sized battlegroups and prepositioned gear, are unlikely to reassure 
nor deter in light of the precision strike and A2AD threat. If NATO and the US want to 
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enhance deterrence by denial meaningfully, then bolder steps will be necessary. 
Technology will be part of the solution, but it is no panacea. Effective deterrence will 
require a robust ground-troop presence, aided by a creative reimagining of the role to be 
played by Baltic troops. These steps will make it more difficult for Russia to present 
NATO with the hard fact of an annexation and occupation of the Baltic States, thereby 
enhancing deterrence and regional stability.  
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